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THE BEDOUIN JUDGE, THE MUFTI,
AND THE CHIEF ISLAMIC JUSTICE:
COMPETING LEGAL REGIMES IN THE
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
LYNN WELCHMAN
This article examines competing legal frameworks in dispute resolu-
tion in the occupied territories, against the background of weakening
central authority, bitter political rivalries, and increasing insecurity
on the ground. Two case studies from 2005 are presented—a killing in
Gaza and an attempted sexual assault in the West Bank—where the
involved parties had recourse to three distinct but overlapping bodies
of law, not all of which were part of the formal Palestinian legal sys-
tem: statutory law, Islamic law, and customary (or tribal) law. The
resolution of these cases, while shedding light on the intersection of
local politics and alternative legal systems, underscores the challenges
of forging a united legal system in a situation of occupation, weak
government, and heterogeneous legal heritage.
SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT of the Palestinian Authority (PA), one result of the po-
litical uncertainties and inadequate security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
has been an increasing recourse to “unofficial” arbitration and the adjudication
of disputes in the context of contests over political power. Three main bodies
of “law” appear most frequently as overlapping normative frameworks in dis-
pute resolution processes: statutory legislation (the law “on the books” in the
areas under the PA’s jurisdiction), Islamic law, and various forms of customary
law—specifically, in the case examined here, “tribal adjudication” (al-qada’
al- a`sha’iri).
This article examines the intersection of these normative frameworks in the
resolution of two cases in mid-2005, one in the Gaza Strip and the other in
the West Bank. Both disputes arose from criminal acts, one a shooting death
and the other an attempted sexual assault; both were clearly within the crim-
inal jurisdiction of the formal courts. Yet, in both cases, the application of
statutory law was avoided or contested and penalties were assessed according
to norms drawing, respectively, upon Islamic law and tribal (or customary)
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law. Specifically, contesting norms were advanced in these cases by three men
with different institutional positions: a Bedouin judge, whose ruling relied on
tribal law; the mufti of Gaza, who headed an arbitration committee that is-
sued a ruling based on Islamic criminal law; and the chief Islamic justice,
who upheld in a commentary on the former case the primacy and author-
ity of statutory law and the formal judiciary, as well as the norms of Islamic
jurisprudence.
These three normative frameworks have never been completely indepen-
dent of one another, nor are they internally homogenous or undifferentiated.
Each has overlapping and mutually constructive influences on the others, both
institutionally and informally. In the cases discussed here, however, the distinc-
tiveness of each body of law is socially constructed by being publicly asserted.
Although the official legal system was not ignored in either case, adjudicators
self-consciously invoked and acted upon norms derived from Islamic law and
customary or tribal law as “alternative” (or parallel) bodies of law to the nascent
central legal system, both doctrinally and institutionally.
“Unofficial” arbitration and adjudication of disputes in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip in the context of contests over political power has been examined by
a number of scholars in recent years. Glenn Robinson, writing in JPS in 1997,
discussed the challenges facing the Palestinian legal community as “a metaphor
for the larger process of power consolidation of the Palestinian Authority.”1
Addressing the emerging field of Palestinian legal studies in 1999, Bernard
Botiveau urged analysts to draw upon “legal anthropology, which considers
the political dimension to play a decisive role in the dynamic process of law
creation and the normalization of social practices.”2 In the current, distressed
Palestinian governance context, it is not just the normalization of practices
but also the formalization of practices as law that is being contested.
SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXTS: “THE BREAKDOWN
OF PUBLIC SECURITY”
By mid-2005, the events of the second intifada and the ongoing violence of
the Israeli occupation had seriously weakened the Palestinian central authority
and limited the reach of its legal organs.3 Public anxiety was mounting over
al-falatan al-amni, “the breakdown of public security,” manifested by assassi-
nations and armed confrontations between different agencies of the security
forces and armed wings of political factions (or individuals claiming such af-
filiations). Armed clashes and invocations of the concept of tha’r, or private
vengeance, had increased alarmingly.4 Adding to political stakes at the time,
Israel’s “unilateral withdrawal” from the Gaza Strip was on the horizon, munic-
ipal elections were ongoing, and the participation of Hamas in the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) elections slated for the following January was seen
as a real possibility.
Chaotic circumstances often promote recourse to “self-help” measures in re-
solving disputes and seeking remedy for wrongs. Thus, recourse to normative
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systems other than those legitimated by the central authority is not necessar-
ily an index of simple preference for one among an array of equally available
options; competition for power also shapes processes of forum selection. For
instance, in the first case presented below, Hamas had a political interest in
promoting a particular normative system at the expense of the centralized
administrative power of the PA. Advocates of unofficial modalities of dispute
resolution tend to cite familiarity, speed of resolution, lower cost, and “effi-
cacy” (i.e., sensitivity to the social position and feelings of the wronged party)
among its advantages.5 Political convenience may also influence the choice of
a particular dispute forum.
In the first case examined here, an arbitration committee headed by the
mufti applied the rulings of Islamic criminal law to a homicide in Gaza, and
subsequently the parties requested the official (statutory) legal system to drop
its own proceedings against the accused. In the second case, which took place
in the West Bank, the parties turned to a Bedouin judge, who imposed de-
liberately extraordinary sanctions unknown in either the official criminal law
system or in Islamic law. It was in reaction to this astonishing ruling that the
chief Islamic justice weighed in with his commentary.
FIRST CASE: THE KILLING OF YUSRA JAMAL AL-`AZAMI
Late in the evening of 8 April 2005, Yusra al- A`zami, a young woman return-
ing home from an outing in Gaza City in an automobile with her sister and
two young men from another family, was shot dead by hooded gunmen pursu-
ing them in another vehicle. The sisters were formally engaged to the young
men, and wedding celebrations were imminent.6 `Azami’s companions were
beaten by the assailants, who made off with the car; two were arrested later
that night and gave up the names of three co-offenders. The next day, the “Asso-
ciation of the People of Jaffa” issued a statement denouncing the murder of the
“bride of Palestine” and reported that the prosecutor’s office had declared that
“the criminals were claiming they belonged to Hamas and had done their ugly
crime as a result of being charged [with this function] by their Hamas leader.”7
The statement gave the names of the five persons allegedly involved, and also
the name of the Hamas official alleged to be responsible for them. The associ-
ation demanded a full investigation, the political disavowal of those involved,
the “clarification of the position of the families of the criminals,” and the per-
petrators’ “clarification of the truth and retaliation [qisas].”8 Failing this, the
statement said, the family of the victim would themselves be obliged to exact
vengeance.
Hamas initially denied any connection with the shooting, but later acknowl-
edged that “individuals affiliated with Hamas” had perpetrated the crime as
an “irresponsible, individual deed.” The movement called for adjudication of
the case “by God’s law.”9 Local press reports covered various political groups’
demands for the PA to enforce law and order and provide security.10 Ten po-
litical factions (including Fatah) signed a statement calling for the killers to
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be handed over to the security forces and “for the law to be applied.”11 A
week after the killing, however, the families of the victims and those of the
perpetrators reached an agreement on “shar` i adjudication,” following which
a “shar` i arbitration committee” was established. On 30 April 2005, the com-
mittee issued a shar` i ruling (hukm shar`i), the translation of which follows.
Shar` i Ruling
Issued in the matter of the grievous incident that took the life of the chaste
and virtuous martyr, Yusra Jamal al- A`zami, of Bayt Lahiya
Saturday 21 Rabi` al-Awwal 1426/30 April 2005
Parties to the case:
First party: the honorable family of the chaste and virtuous martyr Yusra
Jamal al- A`zami (“al-Dada”) and the honorable Zarnda family.
Second party: the honorable Daghmash, al-Li, al-Daya, and al-Barniya
families.
Arbitration committee: Shaykh A`bd al-Karim Khalil al-Kahlut, Dr. Ahmad
Diyab Shwaydah, Dr. Mazin Isma`il Haniya, Dr. Yusuf `Awad al-Sharafi,
Shaykh Sa i`d A`bd al-Malak Abu al-Jabin.
Based on the grievous incident which led to the killing of the chaste and
virtuous young woman Yusra, daughter of Jamal al- A`zami; and the
agreement of all the above-mentioned parties to be ruled by the Islamic
shari`a out of commitment to the command of God Almighty: “By your
Lord, they will not be true believers until they let you decide between
them in all matters of dispute, and find no resistance in their souls to your
decisions, accepting them totally”12; and the agreement of all parties upon
the above-mentioned shar` i committee of arbitration to rule between
them: The committee undertook the investigation and took all necessary
measures to arrive at justice and nullify falsehood. Finally, the committee
met in full at the house of Shaykh `Abd al-Karim al-Kahlut on Saturday 21
Rabi` al-Awwal 1426/30 April 2005 and issued by consensus a decision
drafted by the head of the committee, Shaykh A`bd al-Karim Kahlut, as
follows:
1. Censure [ta`zir] of the persons who followed over a long distance the
car of the martyr and her companions, these persons not being directed
by any person or faction or tanzim but rather doing what they did of
their own accord.
2. Detailed and reliable investigation established that the shooting was
done by [only] one individual with no one else participating.
3. The shooting was not intended to kill . . . The shots occurred randomly
to different places, far apart from each other. Thus the killing was
accidental, and the perpetrator must pay the heavy [mughallaz]
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financial compensation [diya] . . . because he did something unworthy
of him and was not charged by anyone to do it, but was rash and
reckless.
4. Accordingly, the heavy diya of 25,000 Jordanian dinars shall be paid to
the person lawfully [shar`an] entitled; the owner of the car shall be
compensated for the damage sustained by the vehicle in the amount of
1,000 American dollars, and the remainder are censured by paying
1,000 Jordanian dinars as compensation to the three persons
accompanying the victim for the fear, injury, and offense they sustained.
5. Those persons who committed this deed explicitly affirmed that they
were not directed by any party whatsoever, and that the Movement of
Islamic Resistance—Hamas—had nothing to do with what happened.
6. Also, the committee thanks Hamas for [its] efforts to bring out the truth
and arrive at justice.
The day after this shar` i ruling appeared, male representatives of the
families signed a “deed of final and absolute reconciliation” citing the
shar` i arbitration and announced that they had reconciled “of our free will
and our complete consent, acknowledged in law and shari`a, and without
any pressure or coercion from anyone.” The parties declared “complete accep-
tance” of the arbitration decision, considering it to supersede “all other rights
unspecified in the arbitration decision,” and called upon “the concerned official
and unofficial parties to take the arbitration decision and the deed of recon-
ciliation into account, and to release those detained in relation to this case,
and not to pursue the others.” Two days after the families signed this deed, the
public reconciliation ceremony (farhat al-musaliha) was held at the house of
“a well-known mediator [rajul al-sulh] in Gaza City.”13
The shar` i ruling was published in al-Quds and al-Risala in early May
2005.14 Both newspapers reported that the public reconciliation rituals be-
tween the families took place “in the presence of a large number of senior
Hamas leaders, notables, scholars, and men of conciliation.” The reports noted
that the event included interventions from a number of the notables present,
in praise particularly of the victim’s family, the reading of the ruling, the cel-
ebration of the “exchange of peace” between the families, and the further
celebration (mahrajan) Hamas held to mark the resolution of the dispute. The
only indication that Yusra al- A`zami’s killing had ever generated controversy
came in an observation in al-Quds that “[t]he case had seen wide and angry
reactions, especially an attempt to abuse it during the election campaign in . . .
Bayt Lahiya . . . and [other] Gaza Strip areas, and even in the West Bank.”
Meanwhile, the foreign press had been covering the incident in detail al-
most from the start, including various reports about the political affiliation of
Yusra al- A`zami and that of her fiance´, hinting at possible interfactional con-
flicts. The story that predominated in the English- and French-language press
was that Yusra had been executed by a Hamas “vice and virtue unit” acting
on the erroneous assumption that the parties in the car had been involved in
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“immoral conduct” during their trip to Gaza City.15 Locally, reports that the
killers were on some kind of “formal” Hamas morality enforcement business—
which would have rendered the movement institutionally and politically re-
sponsible for the death—stoked tensions just before municipal elections.
Hamas reportedly “mounted a desperate damage-limitation exercise,”16 while
other parties decried the perceived exploitation of the incident in the lead-up
to the elections. Some observers suggested that Hamas was seeking to reassure
Western (especially European) observers about its social agenda, particularly
in light of its electoral ambitions.
The case disappeared from the local press until the arbitration committee
published its findings, which entirely exculpated Hamas. A French-language
article published a month later reported that senior Hamas officials had visited
the victim’s family and proposed payment of diya and that, while the family
had not agreed, they had “accepted, at Hamas’s insistence, to put the issue to
shar` i judgment.”17
SECOND CASE: AN EXTRAORDINARY RULING
Just as in the case of Yusra al- A`zami’s killing in Gaza, the victim in the sec-
ond case—an attempted sexual assault in the West Bank—was female, while
all those who were actively involved in the resolution process were male. In
contrast to the Gaza case, however, there was no immediate publicity concern-
ing the incident itself, which only came to light with the publication of a long
article in al-Quds that focused not on the crime but rather on the very unusual
ruling rendered by Daif Allah Abu Dahuk, a tribal judge in the Ramallah area
who is also a practicing lawyer and who was standing in the upcoming munici-
pal elections.18 The names of the perpetrator, the victim, and the victim’s father
(who represented her) are not mentioned. The anonymity of the actors appears
to be the result of the journalist’s agreement not to publish identifying details.
The text of the ruling presents significant challenges to interpretation be-
cause it risks being read as “exoticizing” or “scandalizing” customary or tribal
law (and wider Palestinian society) in the Orientalist trope.19 A closer reading,
however, will allow us to locate this deliberately shocking ruling in the politi-
cal context of competing normative discourses at the time. The following is a
translation of the press report about Abu Dahuk’s ruling:
100,000 Jordanian Dinars’ Financial Reparation Paid on the
Spot; Tribal Judge20 Issues Deterrent Ruling against Youth for
Attempted Assault on Girl’s Honor
In an incident demonstrating the power and capacity of the
tribal justice system to restore right to those entitled and to
see that the wronged receive justice, elite elders of al-Jahilin,
al-Ka`abna, and Abu Dahuk vindicated the honor21 of a girl
after a young man from the Ramallah district made an attempt
on her honor. She managed to escape after seeking help from
good people.
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. . . [S]aid young man saw a girl walking in an area close to
an Israeli military checkpoint . . . stopped his car, and asked
her to get in with him. When she refused, he got out of his
vehicle—a Ford Transit—and pursued her.
When she realized his bad intentions, she turned and fled.
The young man persisted in his folly and followed her, thinking
he could catch her, but the girl used the only weapon she had:
her voice. She screamed for help with all her might and two
youths from the [Bedouin] Arabs of al-Jahilin and Abu Dahuk
heard her. They ran after the youth, caught and tackled him.
. . . The story of “the chase” ends here, but after this painful
incident the family of the girl resolved to obtain their due
through the tribal justice system in what is known as the
“manshad.”22
. . . [A] large customary jaha [delegation], including nota-
bles from Jerusalem and Ramallah, went to the home of the
girl’s father, where they were met by a large gathering of the
elders of [the clans of] al-Jahilin, al-Ka`abna, and Abu Dahuk.
The leader of the jaha, Ahmad Najib al-Hizmawi, con-
demned the incident, calling it wicked and unprovoked, and
announced that he was prepared to pay the due demanded of
the offender.
Then the girl’s father took all the tribal requisites for guar-
antee [kafl], and asked the offender’s family to swear an oath
. . . before all the people, that their son had not been provoked
by any person [to commit this act] and had not planned his
deed, which had come suddenly from him as devil-like con-
duct, and thus their honor had . . . suffered no stain.
. . . After hearing the oath, the girl’s father asked Attorney
Shaykh Daif Allah Abu Dahuk to be judge of the manshad and
settle the case. He then presented the details of the incident
before the judge.
The qadi asked the offender’s family whether they ac-
knowledged their son’s offense, and they avowed that they
did. He asked them to pay what is known as “rizqat al-
manshad,”23 while he consulted Abu Dahuk elders and then
began presenting the factual findings.
. . . [T]he judge said that this was an event with no justifica-
tion, and that “this manshad is a manshad of the ‘sa’ihat al-
duhin’24—she who screams in the forenoon—as the incident
took place between ten in the morning and twelve midday;
and after hearing the oath, I hereby commence presentation of
the manshad from the first moment that the incident began.”
. . . The judge ruled, with regard to the youth who commit-
ted the deed, that his right eye be plucked out, the eye with
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which he looked at the girl . . . and that his tongue be cut out,
the tongue with which he called to her . . . Her deed in not
responding to him and in running away is valued at ten white
camels, while his in returning moments later in his vehicle to
the same place to watch the girl is set at ten black camels. For
going in the other direction and stopping his vehicle to catch
her, his right foot shall be severed from his shin and his other
eye shall be gouged out by reason of his surveillance of her
. . . As for his chasing after her for a distance of 1,500 meters,
the distance is valued as follows: For the first hundred meters,
every meter at a hundred dinars; for the second hundred me-
ters, every meter at 200 dinars; for the third hundred meters,
every meter at 500 dinars, and the rest of the distance is set at
1,000 dinars for every meter, by reason of his persistence in
what he was doing, without thought and without hesitation,
despite the length of the distance.
The judge further ruled that 100,000 dinars be paid by
the family of the youth for the girl running and her sandals
falling off and she being unable to pick them up; and another
100,000 dinars for her shawl falling from her head and she
being unable at the time to retrieve it; and a third 100,000 for
her fear and the fear of her sisters, and for her screaming until
her cousins rescued her.
As for the whole distance of 1,500 meters, a white cloth,
one meter wide, shall be spread upon it. At the start of the
cloth there shall be a man of black [skin] color, not more than
one meter tall, with a black coffee-pot (“dalla”) full of bitter
coffee. In the middle of the distance there shall be a “hanti”
[olive-skinned] man, likewise not more than a meter tall with
a copper jug of water for those who ask for water. At the end
of the cloth there shall be a white[-skinned] man not more
than a meter tall carrying a silver tray of sweets in felicitation
of the girl’s innocence of the heedless youth.25
As for the two youths who rescued her, each of them shall
be given two white purebred horses with white saddles upon
them, and two white purebred camels. The distress caused
to the people, who were mourning a death, is set at 50,000
dinars. As for the perpetrator, he is forbidden for the rest of
his life to wear white upon his head . . . And the vehicle which
the perpetrator drove shall be burned in the same place, to
be a warning for those who do not heed.
After that, judge Abu Dahuk asked for the calculation of
the sum and for the evaluation of the cost of the body parts
by the jaha.26 Then he waived a third of the “manshad”
out of respect for the jaha and the admission of guilt by the
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perpetrator’s family, and left the other two thirds to be dealt
with by the father and the family of the girl and those present.
The qadi waived the “rizqat al-manshad” and returned it to
the head of the jaha.
After negotiations and intervention by the jaha seeking
leniency, each member of the jaha was assigned a part in
paying the “manshad”—whether financial or in-kind.
After the jaha had paid the 100,000 dinars, the girl’s father
rose and said: “My daughter’s deliverance from this criminal
cannot be assessed in money,” and he donated the sum to the
Fatah tanzim in Jalazun camp, asking them to use it for the
benefit of prisoners, the families of martyrs, and the needy, and
declaring that he did not want money but honor [karama].
The unnamed journalist who wrote this report clearly found some parts as
unfamiliar as he or she expected readers would: Words specific to Bedouin law
were presented within quotation marks in the original
The Bedouin judge’s
ruling blended elements of
tribal law—the guarantees,






a refugee camp, and the
ubiquitous Ford Transit.
text. The ruling was very different from the routine
press reports publicizing customary “truces” and rec-
onciliation agreements involving large delegations that
may include not only clan leaders and local notables but
also PA officials and senior figures from political parties
as well. The entire process, from the ruling until the
agreement on the final arrangements, apparently took
one month.27
Abu Dahuk’s ruling illustrates the integration of fea-
tures common to contemporary West Bank Palestinian
life with the mechanics and assumptions of the tribal
law process. Thus, the distinctive proceedings of the
manshad—the guarantees, the horses and camels, the
elaborate symbolic elements of the ruling, and the negotiation of the final
penalty—are blended into a story involving an Israeli military checkpoint, the
al-Aqsa Brigades, Fatah tanzim, a refugee camp, and the ubiquitous Ford Tran-
sit. The traditional collective oath included a denial that any outside involve-
ment had “pushed” the man into doing what he had done, thus ruling out
the involvement of Israeli agents looking to manipulate local families through
issues of “honor.” The donation of the final sum to a worthy cause, a common
although not universal practice, invoked the national struggle. Moreover, there
are suggestions that, in the end, the amount was returned to the perpetrator’s
family.28
In interviews with the author, Abu Dahuk stated that he based this ex-
traordinary ruling on an early twentieth-century Jordanian precedent. The rul-
ing itself makes clear that the physical punishments enumerated were never
intended to be carried out,29 and they would, of course, have been con-
sidered criminal acts. Nevertheless, even as mechanisms for calculating the
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financial penalty due, they evoked a normative framework so far removed from
dominant social and legal discourses that readers were shocked in ways per-
haps unintended by Abu Dahuk. Noting both positive and negative reactions
to the ruling, Abu Dahuk reported that it had been “discussed in Saudi Arabia
and in Jordan” as well as in Palestine, where he had answered questions about
the case on local television. Acknowledging that his precedents were drawn
“from older times, not from current practice,” he related that he frequently
heard comments to the effect that “we don’t do this sort of thing.”30
As in the case of the murder of Yusra al- A`zami, the aggrieved parties’ mo-
tivation is not immediately apparent from the public narrative. Why did the
victim’s family choose this resolution method? Who influenced their decision?
Who participated in the decision? What were their parameters of “choice”?
Abu Dahuk observed that had the family chosen to take this case to court,
they might have expected the perpetrator to receive a prison sentence of six
months had he been found guilty. Some observers speculated that the case’s
focus on vindicating a woman’s honor would have provided strong incentive
for choosing the `asha’iri system over the civil courts.
The title of the al-Quds report about the case, which characterized the rul-
ing as a “deterrent,” indicates the judge’s motivation: its deliberate severity
aimed at preventing the victim’s family from pursuing physical retaliation. The
extraordinary statement underlined their rights and entitlements while placing
the ruling firmly in the context of increasing acts of private revenge in disputes
between families. Thus, the perpetrator was afforded a level of personal secu-
rity that might not have been provided by a court process.31 The extraordinary
nature of the ruling is therefore not an index of exoticism but rather represents
a strategy of containment. The secondary target of deterrence was anyone else
who might have been tempted to behave like the perpetrator in the social
context of the vulnerability of young women in the Ramallah area to predatory
male behavior.
The most in-depth doctrinal response to this ruling came from the chief
Islamic justice. In his regular column on the “religious affairs” page of al-Quds
a couple of weeks later, Shaykh Taysir al-Tamimi published an opinion piece
that began with the Quranic phrase “judgement is God’s alone.”32 Positioning
himself as a “legal, shar` i , and judicial party,” Tamimi asserted his authority
to contest the normative discourse of Abu Dahuk’s ruling through three refer-
ential frameworks: “state” law, Islamic law, and the institution of the judiciary.
Tamimi’s column emphasized the theoretical underpinnings of the office of
judge in Islamic fiqh, supported with references to a set of hadith and a re-
minder that the ruler appoints the judge (thus, implementation of the judge’s
rulings is the prerogative of the political ruler). In the fourth paragraph, Tamimi
addressed the role of tribal judges:
We value the positive positions offered by the tribal judges to
our Palestinian community in calming matters between dis-
puting parties through the a`twa and the hudna, which . . .
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prevent the occurrence of evil things. But . . . [these] rulings
must not violate the shari`a. Rather, they should accord with
. . . its bases and established principles, and the penalty must
issue from a judicial authority. Otherwise, people will take it
merely as speculation and accusation, and injustice or tyranny
could result. So it must accord with the texts and principles
of the Islamic shari`a, and if it violates these, then it is of the
jahiliyya [pre-Islamic era]: “Do they want judgment accord-
ing to the time of pagan ignorance? Is there any better judge
than God for those of firm faith?”33
Pinpointing violations of the shari`a that he discerned in Abu Dahuk’s rul-
ing, Tamimi also alluded indirectly to criticisms of partiality made of the tribal
law system: “The shar` deals with everyone with equality, does not distinguish
between one person and another, does not give weight to people’s superiority
in wealth, status (hasab), or lineage (nasab); nor does it back the strong and
empowered against the victimized citizen.”
THE POLITICS OF INTERSECTING NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS
The emerging Palestinian legal system in the West Bank and Gaza demon-
strates various levels and degrees of legal pluralism:34 different laws apply statu-
torily to different sectors of the population; the nascent central authority for-
mally recognizes as “law” norms of which it is not the originator; and parallel
systems of “social ordering”—as demonstrated by the cases examined here—
function in quasi-judicial fashion, potentially conflicting with the central legal
system’s requirements. On the formal level, the Basic Law recognizes “prin-
ciples of shari`a” as “a basic source of law”; “shari`a-based law” is applied
in the shari`a courts enjoying jurisdiction over specified areas of law. These
courts—and those serving different Christian communities—are constituted
and administered separately from the regular (nizami) court system.
Along with Muslim family law, waqf, and certain other matters, the shari`a
courts are also empowered to assess the amount of diya due in cases of bodily
injury and killing—but only on application from the injured parties, and only
after the regular court system has completed its ruling. Beyond this, the shari`a
courts have no jurisdiction over criminal matters, which fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the nizami courts. As for “customary” or “tribal law” processes,
although there is no statutory recognition of them per se, the law does give
weight to out-of-court procedures and settlements, including agreement and
reconciliation (sulh) between parties to disputes involving offenses against
the person (e.g., wounding or killing), countenancing a limited reduction in
penalties imposed on perpetrators.
The mufti of Gaza, who headed the shar` i arbitration committee in the case
of Yusra al- A`zami’s murder, is a member of the Office of Fatwa and Islamic Re-
search, headed by the Supreme Mufti of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Lands.
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Formally appointed in towns across the West Bank and Gaza, muftis currently
have no formal adjudication role, although they do invest considerable effort
in mediation and conciliation activities.35 In this particular case, however, the
mufti headed a committee empowered by the parties to arbitrate in accordance
with Islamic law and issue a ruling, rather than simply to assist reconciliation
efforts. Such a committee has no formal standing to conduct criminal inves-
tigations and issue “rulings” that directly challenge the state’s monopoly over
criminal justice. Furthermore, concerning the awarding of diya, the commit-
tee’s ruling also challenged the substance of “Islamic law” on which shari`a
courts (headed by the chief Islamic justice) are empowered to rule. The diya
awarded, albeit increased in view of aggravating circumstances, was apparently
assessed at half the full diya because the deceased was female.36 The halving
of diya for the life of a female derives from some interpretations of traditional
law, but it is no longer applied in the shari`a courts. The chief Islamic justice
states that no distinction is made on the basis of the victim’s gender.37 The
ruling on this matter also differentiated the position of the mufti and his com-
mittee from the political processes. The article in the French daily Liberation
reported that Hamas officials who visited the `Azami family in the aftermath of
the killing offered what would appear to have been a full diya of $ 80,000 to the
family.38
As for central legal processes, the fact that the mufti of Gaza headed the
arbitration committee reveals the case’s importance. The ruling was pitched to
a normative level presumably aimed at competing effectively with the formal
judicial system.39 Nor was this simply a case of a prominent local individual
taking on a difficult task in a personal capacity: the original text of the arbitra-
tion committee’s ruling was not only signed by the four other members of the
committee, but also stamped with the mufti’s official insignia. The ruling did
not cite any system of law except the “Islamic shari`a,” although the commit-
tee issued the “ruling” in the form of an arbitration between families, leaving
the guilty unnamed. So, while attributing individual responsibility for partic-
ular deeds, the actual perpetrators “disappeared,” since the ruling was issued
between (and subsequently accepted by) the respective families as the “parties
to the case.”
The process and trajectories of this ruling conformed to Hamas’s insistence
that their members be held accountable “under God’s law” rather than un-
der the criminal law system, through which the PA could assert its presumed
state-like authority over manifestations of “security chaos.” Hamas sought the
substantive application of Islamic law while adapting processes of informal cus-
tomary dispute resolution in order to present the result as a sulh (reconciliation)
before the formal legal authorities. Press coverage of the public reconciliation
ceremony elucidated the meshing of Islamic law rulings with reconciliation
rituals derived from customary law processes, as well as Hamas’s role in the
case.
Ultimately, it was in the political and “customary” processes that the
“shar` i ruling” was embedded and legitimized. Here, the central legal system
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was engaged: statutory law was procedurally evident in the formal textual dec-
larations of the deed of final reconciliation and was also a critical part of the




central legal system and
statutory law were
engaged, while the victims’
families’ privacy was
protected by a
reconciliation that did not
hold any one individual
accountable.
agreement between the families. The deputy public
prosecutor appears to have responded to the families’
call, rather than to the issuing of the shar` i ruling,
stressing that the reconciliation concerned the “private
rights” of the victims’ families rather than the prosecu-
tor’s right to take necessary legal measures on behalf
of the public authority. In the end, the formal legal sys-
tem failed to hold anyone personally accountable for
`Azami’s killing. The two suspects who had been ap-
prehended were subsequently released, and there did
not appear to have been further follow-up.40 Hamas as
a party (as distinct from individual Hamas party mem-
bers) was publicly vindicated of any allegations of in-
volvement and thus “rehabilitated.”
By comparison, the West Bank case is presented entirely within the frame-
work of “customary law” (specifically “tribal law”) and lacks any apparent
engagement with the formal legal system. Nor does it provide any references,
in the extracts of the ruling reproduced in the press report, to “classical” Is-
lamic law. Given the reciprocal influences of Islamic law and customary law,
a key focus for those seeking to control or “rehabilitate” customary institu-
tions is the extent to which certain procedures and sanctions in the latter
violate the rulings of the former.41 The broad and amorphous realm of “clan-
based ‘customary’ law” has arguably been strengthened during the period of PA
rule.42
The literature on adaptations of customary dispute resolution processes
makes clear the multiple and overlapping institutional/political/kinship roles
played by different actors in emerging processes of “social ordering,” and the
intertwining and entanglement of different elements of the legal system and
legal culture.43 In the Palestinian context, political groupings’ adaptations of
customary law to self-help processes can be traced to the first intifada.44 In
the post-Oslo period, the emergence of Palestinian statutory law casts new an-
alytical light on legal pluralism: the West Bank case highlights the very specific
framework of Bedouin law while simultaneously illustrating the contestations
of different legal cultures and communities. The victim of the offense was
Bedouin, while the perpetrator was not; the judge, a Bedouin, notes that his
ruling would have had additional features had it been an entirely intra-Bedouin
case. Whereas Hamas’s involvement in the first case dictated the application of
classical Islamic law within an adapted customary law framework, the involve-
ment of individuals affiliated with Fatah in the second case only becomes clear
in the press account at the very end, in the distribution of the financial award
by the victim’s father to the Fatah tanzim in Jalazun camp; the impression
given is that all parties submitted to the specific framework and substantive
norms of “tribal law.”
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For his part, the chief Islamic justice explicitly denounced those parts of
the “manshad” ruling he found to contradict the requirements of the Islamic
shari`a, acting as an authoritative voice on substantive Islamic criminal law, al-
though this falls outside his juridical institutional remit. He was addressing the
norms. At the same time, his intervention clearly asserted the authority of the
official judiciary, of which he is a senior member, over adjudicators imposing
penalties from outside the formal system. Thus, he pointedly recognized the
contribution made by the procedural aspects of truce integral to the manage-
ment of tribal disputes, while insisting that the imposition of penalties is the
prerogative solely of the “official” judiciary. He buttressed his argument with
appeals to public interest as well as to Islamic jurisprudence. No comparable
official commentaries on Abu Dahuk’s ruling appeared in the press. The chief
Islamic justice thus emerges as the foremost institutional defender of the formal
legal system and, by implication, of Palestinian statutory law.
Another part of the public discourse that informs a reading of Abu Dahuk’s
ruling (and the press report thereof) is the fact that, against the plethora of
dispute process frameworks drawing on and adapting customary law prac-
tices and personalities, there are complaints that individuals lacking sufficient
knowledge have exercised functions for which they were not qualified.45 Such
complaints can be interpreted in a variety of ways: as expressing a desire to
maintain the integrity of a system; as an effort to control access to the politi-
cally (and economically) powerful position of conciliation; and as a response to
negative connotations associated with the idea of “tribalism” in some sectors
of the local community. In mid-2005, a number of press articles referred dis-
paragingly to “tribalism” as being behind the rise in violence between and
within families.46 The chief Islamic justice invoked “the force of tribalism
and jahili zeal” in a commentary on increasing incidents of revenge murders
and “honor” killings.47 Two weeks prior to the publication of the West Bank rul-
ing, the Abu Dahuk clan had felt obliged to clarify publicly their role in events
preceding the “honor” killing of Fatin Habash, a young Ramallah woman who,
at an earlier point, had sought refuge with them. She was later killed, apparently
by her father, who gave himself up to the police.48
It is possible that the wider publicity given to Abu Dahuk’s ruling in the
attempted assault case aimed at redeeming “Bedouin values” and traditions
as understood by a Bedouin judge in the specific case of the protection of a
young woman’s honor, while also demonstrating the Abu Dahuk clan’s ability
to contain a potentially escalating dispute. Indeed, the al-Quds report’s intro-
ductory sentence—“In an incident demonstrating the power and capacity of
the tribal justice system to restore right to those entitled and to see that the
wronged receive justice” (apparently the reporter’s only commentary on the
case)—frames the ruling as an illustration of the efficacy of tribal law. In
the broader context of public concern over access to justice within the for-
mal legal system, Abu Dahuk’s ruling asserted the normative values of tribal
law in a highly formalized—even ritualized—albeit unofficial process of dispute
resolution.
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Tamimi’s response integrated the state legal system with the normative val-
ues of Islamic shari`a in an explicit contestation of the authority of the tribal
law system. Although neither he nor his office had publicly responded to the
“shar` i ruling” issued in the Gazan case, his insistence that formally appointed
judges are the only parties empowered to issue rulings and impose sanctions
arguably applies equally to the role played by the mufti and his fellow members
of the shar` i Arbitration Committee in Gaza.
CONCLUSION
The hybrid legal heritage of the West Bank and Gaza Strip cannot but chal-
lenge the unification, centralization, and institutional empowerment of the cen-
tral Palestinian legal system—and not only because institution building is taking
place in a context of hostile and predatory military occupation, ongoing dis-
possession, and politically powerful donor-driven agendas. The combination
of the central authority’s weakness with an embryonic “national” legislation
and prospective statehood stimulates competition between different, though
overlapping, normative frameworks. June Starr observes that “law is a process
. . . that . . . is shaped by rules and cultural logic, and . . . it is also a discourse
fought over by very real agents with different political agendas.”49 The two cases
discussed here illuminate this dynamic. This is true whether the actors were
competing for “control” over norm-making in a particular space, with a view
to future legislation, or (more specifically) with a view to establishing norms in
the framework of particular disputes. Hamas’s 2006 victory in the Legislative
Council elections does not signal the triumph of a single normative repertoire
in Palestinian legislative processes, either doctrinally or practically. How dif-
ferent discourses of “the law” develop, and how other normative discourses
continue to be asserted in the public sphere and applied in unofficial (as well
as official) dispute processes, will doubtless remain open to interpretation as
metaphors for contests well beyond the sphere of “law.”
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